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Unbearable Witness: Toward a Politics of Listening
Wendy Hui Kyong Chun *
On Wednesday, 6 December 1989, around 5 P.M., Marc Lepine (né Gamil
Roderigue Gharbi) dressed in hunting garb entered a classroom in the École
Polytechnique. Disturbing a presentation by Eric Chavarie, he waved a .22-
caliber rifle and ordered the men and women into opposite corners of the
classroom. Thinking it was a joke arranged to relieve the tedium of the last
hour of the term, no one moved. A single gunshot persuaded them otherwise.
Next, Lepine ordered the men to leave. Alone with the women, he stated, "I am
here to fight against feminism that is why I am here." Nathalie Provost, a 23-
year-old mechanical engineering student, argued, "Look, we are just women
studying engineering, not necessarily feminists ready to march on the streets
to shout we are against men, just students intent on leading a normal life."
Lepine responded, "You're women, you're going to be engineers. You're all a
bunch of feminists. I hate feminists." He then opened fire, killing six women-
-and closing the discussion. After leaving the classroom, Lepine stalked
through the halls of the school saying, "I want the women." Lepine killed
himself at approximately 5:35 p.m., his gun still loaded and the police not yet
in sight. The total death count: fourteen women and Marc Lepine.
And then the discussion reopened.
The unexpected horror of this "American-style carnage" (Pelletier 33) shocked most 
Canadians and defied them to make sense of the worst one-day massacre in Canadian 
history. To those whose complacency had been shattered, it was imperative that some 
lesson, some understanding be extracted from the events of 6 December 1989. In 
response, the Montreal police launched a full-scale investigation, centered on the life of 
Marc Lepine. The day after the massacre, the police released a brief biography that 
described Lepine as "an intelligent but deeply troubled young man with no known 
psychiatric history" and alluded to a suicide note, found on his person, which blamed 
feminists for his life's misery (Malarek and Aubin A1). The authorities, however, soon 
aborted their investigation. On 11 December 1989, the chief coroner, Jean Grennier, told 
the press that he preferred not to call for a public inquiry since an inquiry would 
rehash "some of the gruesome and sickening aspects of the tragedy for no good 
reason. It would mean more pain and suffering for the families." The coroner did say 
that he would call for a public inquiry if he felt the public was not being properly 
informed, but he argued that so far "the public is very well informed" (Malarek "More 
Massacre Details" A14). The next day, the Montreal police refused to answer reporters' 
questions and stated that they "will provide any further pertinent information when it
2becomes available" (Malarek "Police Refusal" A18). According to the authorities, retelling
the event equaled reinflicting pain upon the bereaved families. For the sake of those
who had suffered most, the authorities argued, discussion must be closed--again.
The authorities, however, never consulted the families in question: the following June,
nine of the fourteen families would join the National Action Committee on the Status of
Women (nac) in calling for a public inquiry into the massacre ("Demanding Answers" 17).
As the police psychologists would later explain, the authorities had closed down the
investigation because they feared that continuing the discussion would unleash an
unstoppable flow of antifeminist violence ("Police Won't Confirm" A16). They interpreted
retelling not only as re-enacting the violence against the bereaved, but also as
propagating violence by calling others to identify with and act as Lepine. Moreover, by
insisting that the already dead Lepine was and should be the only person implicated in
the massacre, they were trying to make it so. Accordingly, the only way to contain the
contagious potential of Lepine's example--the only way to re-repress the desire to kill
feminists--was to make the entire Montreal Massacre taboo. Thus, while they were
claiming that the massacre was an isolated and incomprehensible event that no amount
of investigation would ever render comprehensible, the authorities were also assuming
that the desire to kill feminists was already present in segments of the general public.
Hence, for their own safety, female reporters and newscasters were advised not to dwell
on the matter. 1
To the surprise of the authorities, it was not male antifeminism that refused to be
contained; it was female testimony. Testimony by women who identified with his victims
flooded the media; vigils were held in almost every city; and anniversaries were and still
are marked religiously. 2 Eventually, the Canadian government would establish a Royal
Commission to investigate violence against women, and declare December 6 an 
official day of commemoration for female victims of male violence. This essay recounts 
the events that led to the Canadian government's about-face and analyzes the 
conflict between feminists and postfeminists that emerged as an aftermath of the 
Montreal Massacre. This ensuing conflict reveals that when feminism makes the
sovereign subject its goal, it produces postfeminism. To be more precise, it produces
postfeminists, who take on postfeminism as a means to survive uneven playing fields.
This strategy, however, far from ensuring equality renders many postfeminists incapable
of acknowledging discrimination.
This essay also complicates theories of testimony and trauma by addressing multiple
and infelicitous testimonies: what happens when an event seems to invoke testimony
not only from its survivors (who are eerily silent), but also from those who were never
physically present, from those who seem to be testifying belatedly to another event?
What happens when those witnessing to the event seem called by the proximity of this
event to their own real or imagined experiences? Most importantly, this essay argues for
a politics of listening as a necessary complement to the politics of speaking. To date,
feminism has concentrated on consciousness raising, on producing speech that breaks
one's silence and inaugurates one as a feminist. Although important, the question of
how to listen and respond to these testimonials has been largely unaddressed, possibly
since the question of listening in general tends to be under-theorized and/or under-
valued: more often than not, we assume we know how to listen. 3 The aftermath of the
Montreal Massacre, this essay argues, brings out the disastrous consequences of
assuming, rather than listening to, testimony.
Exposed
After the Montreal police refused to hold an inquest, it appeared that the crisis of truth 
and evidence resulting from the massacre would only be addressed through the media, 
through a mediatization of the event. There would be no juridical counterpart to the 
media coverage. Only in the glare of publicity could victims, experts, and the police 
offer their testimony--that is, "vow to tell , to promise  and produce one's own speech as
material evidence for truth" (Felman and Laub 5). 4 Because of this, those who testified, 
those who tried to expose, produce, and circulate the truth, found themselves exposed, 
produced, and circulated in turn. Because there would be no privileged juridical space 
that demarcated eyewitnesses from commentators or expert witnesses, the task of 
comprehending the massacre and placing it within historical or societal
context would be open to the public. 5
The media followed the police's example by treating Lepine as key to understanding the 
massacre. Within the first week after the murders there were three main narratives 
competing for the public's support: that the massacre was an isolated, incomprehensible 
act of a madman; that it was a case of child abuse reproducing its violence in a 
disturbed young man; that it was a crime against women and, as such, representative of 
Canadian misogyny.
The first narrative, of Lepine as a Mad Killer, coincided with the Montreal police 
interpretation and gained a fast hold on Québecois opinion. According to this 
explanation, there could be no political motivation behind the killings since an insane 
subject could not act rationally and thus politically. There could be no answer to the 
question, "Why did this happen?" The fact that all of Lepine's victims were female was 
incidental: it was unfortunate that these particular young women died, but any group 
could have been targeted--who can understand the logic of a madman? What was 
particularly frightening about the massacre in light of this interpretation was that Lepine 
had no prior psychiatric history and that his insanity could only be determined, after the 
fact, by his murderous act. Nonetheless, there were lessons to be learned: mass murder 
is not only an American problem; stiffen gun control laws; and invest in police 
psychology so that dangerously insane but apparently normal people cannot get gun 
permits.
The second interpretation also portrayed Lepine as insane, but as an insane victim. 
Numerous articles describing the childhood of Marc Lepine cited the testimony of child 
psychologists to show how the physical abuse he suffered at the hands of his Algerian 
father combined with his steady diet of war movies had shaped him into an antifeminist 
mass murderer. As a victim of abuse, it was argued, Lepine could not help but repeat 
the violence around him. Once again, any larger responsibility for the Montreal Massacre 
disappeared, for, as the product of an aberrant family, Lepine's actions were 
comprehensible but in no way representative of Canadian society. Rather, Lepine 
represented the possible ramifi- cations of "cultural differences" and the potential for 
violence lurking within all abused children. Again, the specificity of his victims vanished, 
since any group could have been targeted. Particularly frightening about the massacre in 
light of this interpretation was that Lepine had undergone therapy as a young boy after 
his parents' divorce precisely to prevent the repetition of violence. Nonetheless, 
there were lessons to be learned: treat children as the "final frontier"; keep old war 
movies away from young children; teach them that violence is not to be 
tolerated; and stiffen gun control laws just in case.
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The last interpretation, produced and supported by most feminists, argued that Lepine's
actions were both comprehensible and reprehensible. Feminist analysts, such as
Francine Pelletier, emphasized the premeditated nature of the massacre in order to
downplay the significance of Lepine's insanity: "He was crazy when he started shooting
but it was a cold, rational and calculated act on his part" (Lamey "Lepine Rampage" A1).
Accordingly, the Montreal Massacre, as representative of the violence inherent in
patriarchal society, was an intense, spectacular instance of a routine event--the killing
of women by men. What made this event particularly tragic to feminists was the
innocence and youthful potential of the victims, for, instead of killing prominent
feminists, Lepine had killed "fourteen of our bright and shining daughters . . . [who]
were doing things that we, their mothers, [had] only dreamed of" (Cameron 161).
Lepine, it seemed, had killed the wrong women: the so-called "crimes" of the feminist
mothers had been visited upon the postfeminist daughters. The violence of the
massacre, however, was not limited to these fourteen deaths, since, as Nicole Brossard
argued, "each woman cried over having been symbolically put to death" ("The Killer" 31).
Essential to the gradual acceptance and dominance of the last narrative was the
publication of Lepine's suicide letter nearly one year after the event. An anonymous
source sent Francine Pelletier a copy of the letter, which named her as an intended
target. Working against the wishes of the police psychologists and some of the
survivors, she made the note public since she "was upset by the extent of the denial
about the real nature of the event--denial that this was a crime against women. . . .
And publishing the note makes Lepine's motive impossible to ignore . . . unlike the
police and the psychologists, I don't believe it is dangerous to have a window inside
Marc Lepine's head. Personally, I think it is dangerous not to, to continue pretending the
Polytechnique (massacre) had nothing to do with anything but the insanity of Marc
Lepine" (Lamey "Lepine Rampage" A1, A4). According to Pelletier, only by publishing
Lepine's suicide letter could Canadians understand the true nature of the massacre, and
thus begin to deal with the trauma this event provoked. By privileging the 
letter and the intentions of Lepine, feminists treated Lepine as their star witness 6:
Would you note that if I commit suicide today 89-12-06 it is not for
economic reasons (for I have waited until I exhausted all my financial means,
even refusing jobs) but for political reasons. Because I have decided to send
the feminists, who have always ruined my life, to their Maker. For seven years
life has brought me no joy and being totally blasé, I have decided to put an
end to those viragos. . . .
Even if the Mad Killer epithet will be attributed to me by the media, I consider
myself a rational erudite that only the Grim Reaper has forced to take extreme
acts. For why persevere to exist if it is only to please the government. Being
rather backward-looking by nature (except for science), the feminists have
always enraged me. They want to keep the advantages of women (e.g.
cheaper insurance, extended maternity leave preceded by a preventive leave
etc.) while seizing for themselves those of men.
Sorry for this too brief letter.
Marc Lepine
[The letter is followed by the nineteen-name list, with a note at the bottom.]
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Nearly died today. The lack of time (because I started too late) has allowed
these radical feminists to survive.
Alea Jacta Est. (Malette and Chalouh 180-81)
Pelletier hoped that endorsing the validity of Lepine's confessed intentions, if not the 
validity of his accusations, would force Canadians to discuss the massacre as a
politically motivated crime against women. 7 And it did (in Anglophone Canada, at 
least). With the publication of the suicide note, more Canadians endorsed the feminist 
interpretation of Lepine's actions as primarily an act of violence against women, as a
political act. 8 As well, the very narrative of the event changed. Lepine writing his 
suicide note began the events of 6 December 1989, rather than his invading the
classroom on the second floor of the École Polytechnique. 9
Lepine's list of the nineteen intended if not actual victims legitimated Francine Pelletier 
and other prominent Québecois feminists' claims to testify on behalf of, and as, victims 
of Lepine. They could no longer be accused of taking the massacre personally, 
because they had been personally implicated by Lepine. Thus, their 
interpretation of the event could no longer be construed as self-serving, as "outside" the 
events of 6 December 1989, since only an accident  prevented them from being Lepine's 
victims; only an accident made these other women Lepine's target. Their interpretation 
of the event thus moved from "ideology" to victim testimony. Because they linked this 
event to other acts of violence endemic to a patriarchal society, the public outpouring of 
testimony by women who had been abused by men--or who felt vulnerable to male 
violence--became essential to establishing the historical and national significance of the 
massacre. In essence, validating Lepine turned feminist testimony from a misfired or 
failed testimony--testimony that does not register as producing the truth--to a 
successful one. Their testimony became largely felicitous after it had been sanctioned by 
Lepine's words. Lepine thus was not only a star witness, but also the  adjudicator. Two 
years after the massacre, under the pressure of these witnesses and their supporters, 
the Canadian government would declare December 6 an official day of commemoration 
for female victims of male violence and would launch a Royal Commission to investigate 
violence against women. Final(?) lessons learned: never again; don't be silent about 
violence against women; mourn, then look into society and yourself; question your 
misogyny; and don't forget.
Accepting Lepine's actions as representative of violence against women has brought 
much needed attention to the question. On the second anniversary of the Montreal 
Massacre, male Members of Parliament (MPs) wearing white ribbons to remember the 
dead listened silently as MP Margaret Mitchell brought the issue of battered wives to the 
floor. Nine years earlier, she had been met with jokes such as, "Do you beat your wife, 
George?" On 6 December 1991, though, "No man in the House would dare to 
laugh" (O'Neill A15). In a "Post-Montreal-Massacre" Canada, violence against women 
emerged as a category in the Canadian News Index. It was a new, comprehensive, 
gendered name for abuse that was formerly hidden under the label 
domestic violence, or undifferentiated from violence in general, or pinned to an 
identity category such as "battered women." To this day, Canadian articles about 
violence against women, sexual harassment, and antifeminism refer directly or indirectly 
to the Montreal Massacre. 
The massacre also caused many engineering societies, albeit reluctantly, to abolish
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more offensive practices such as strippers at Iron Ring Stag parties; mascots called "The
Ridgid Tool" (University of Waterloo); and racist and sexist jokes published in society
newspapers (University of Calgary and University of British Columbia). The massacre tore
down the walls of secrecy and arrogance that had protected engineering societies from
outside scrutiny and forced these societies to respond to "lay" complaints. Engineering
was forced to look critically, rather than nostalgically, at former decades in which the
traditional Lady Godiva Parade (featuring a prostitute riding naked on a horse) and
pornography in the school newspaper had been normal practices. Lastly, the massacre
motivated more women to enter engineering and also motivated universities and
government to provide incentive programs for these women. 10
I believe these changes have been positive, yet I also believe there are dangers in
allowing this narrative to explain fully the Montreal Massacre. Making the massacre
representative of all violence against women emptied the event of its specificity and
flattened the differences among domestic violence, the violence of the massacre, and
"the fear with which every woman must live." This narrative, however unintentionally,
privileged fear of violence as the issue that unites women and defines women as women.
Moreover, it focused on Lepine as key to understanding the massacre, as though
Lepine's misogyny was not only a necessary, but a sufficient reason for the event. 11 By
privileging the perpetrator's testimony in its attempt to understand the event, the
feminist interpretation thus unwittingly undercut the significance of the testimonies of
Lepine's actual victims. As I discuss later, by conflating all woman-targeted violence, by
arguing that every woman had been symbolically put to death, this narrative allowed
women to assume this violence as a common experience in order to build communal
support, but it also inadvertently preempted an engagement with the actual victims. This
narrative thus exposed and widened fault lines between certain older feminists and
younger women--usually women in male-dominated fields--who resented the older
feminists' commentary and their imposition and usurpation of "victim" status. By
insisting on "don't forget" and the need to publicize the event, feminists kept certain
unwilling eyewitnesses in the public's eye, calling into question exactly what we were
not to forget. Lastly, this interpretation encouraged and was encouraged by paternal
men who took the blame for the massacre and for "the fear with which every woman 
must live." For these men, the massacre pointed to the need to revive chivalry--to 
teach men not to abuse women and not to leave the classroom when their women were 
under attack. For these reasons, I believe there are dangers in allowing ourselves to 
be placated too easily--in allowing the massacre to be boiled down into some pithy 
"lessons learned." We should not, and cannot, rest in our reading of the Montreal 
Massacre.
Thus, I will reopen the case of the Montreal Massacre through an analysis of the public
dispute between feminists and postfeminists. I do so to turn a dispute framed as an
argument between "mothers" and "daughters," "victims" and the "unvictimizable" into a
reassessment of the goals and methods of feminism and postfeminism. I want
particularly to draw out the full ramifications of the slogan "personal is political," or,
more precisely, the implications and limitations of basing the political on personal
experience. As the impasse between feminists and postfeminist survivors makes
painfully clear, sharing or being called to share a common experience--even one so
powerful as suffering abuse from a man--cannot guarantee solidarity. It confirms Judith
Butler's point that "an effort to give universal or specific content to the category of
women, presuming that that guarantee of solidarity is required in advance, necessarily
[produces] factionalization" ("Contingent Foundations" 15). It also makes clear that
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testifying and testimony are not simple gestures and that experience cannot be treated
as something that a subject undergoes and then possesses. Who, after all, is called to
testify and to whose truth do you testify? How does one listen and respond to
testimony?
Will the Victim Please Stand Up
Is the witness the one who sees, the one who undergoes, or the one who
propagates, the accident to which he bears witness?
(Barbara Johnson qtd. in Felman and Laub 23)
The media, in reporting resistance to feminist testimony, did not focus on angry male 
responses, but rather the testimony of certain female survivors and female engineering
students. 12 Male complaints about feminist "misuse" of the event did appear, but 
highlighting the accusations made by women allowed the "respectable" media to publish 
antifeminist diatribes that, given the events of 6 December 1989, they probably would 
not have otherwise published. The media found an especially fertile source in 
Nathalie Provost, the young woman who had tried to reason with Lepine. Provost 
interpreted Pelletier's publication of the suicide note as a deliberately hostile act. At first, 
Provost refused to acknowledge that the massacre had affected more people than the 
actual survivors. She refused to acknowledge that other women needed to talk about 
the event in the context of their own lives and experiences. In response to the letter's 
publication, Provost chided feminists for losing sight of the true victims' needs: "Those 
of us who survived are strong and solid. We grew tremendously. Now, we need our 
peace. We need serenity" (Peritz A1). She refused to acknowledge that the event she 
wanted forgotten could help others unite under the mantra "Never Forget."
Provost's plea for peace was not necessarily a rejection of the feminists' interpretation, 
but rather a rejection of their testimony. According to Provost, feminist testimony 
needlessly propagated the accident, since those who had survived--those for whom the 
massacre "really" mattered--had grown strong from their experience, had extracted 
personal lessons from it. Any further discussion of the event or otherwise "helpful" 
dialogue was harmful since it recirculated images and narratives in the media that made
peace impossible for those who decided to keep  their peace. 13 It disturbed their 
serenity by forcing the issue of their own testimony--testimony that many felt unable to 
give.
Provost was, after all, the first female survivor to speak to the press about the massacre, 
if only to demand the end of public speculation. Speaking to the Canadian press from 
her hospital bed, Provost defined further public recounting of the massacre as morbid: 
"You know what has happened. I am not going to dwell on it. It has been a nightmare. I 
have talked it over with my friends. I don't intend to do it in public. It was horrible; to 
dwell on the details now would be morbid" (Buchignani A1). Provost, finding it 
impossible both to speak and not to speak, emphasized the importance of taking leave, 
of leaving the event. To dwell on the details now was unhealthy or diseased, not only for 
herself but for everyone else as well. Witnessing for the end of witnessing, Provost
insisted no one else could bear witness for the witness. 14 No one else could bear the 
responsibility to speak for or to others, even as she, in order to survive, was refusing to 
be summoned to the media's witness stand as an eyewitness.
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Although refusing to re-narrate the events, Provost, the "hero" of the massacre, did 
have two messages she wanted to disseminate. First, she wanted "to tell [others] . . . 
that there was nothing that could have saved her friends, to tell others who survived and 
perhaps herself that there should be no guilt" (Kastor B1). No one could have 
prevented the massacre:
He had decided to do what he did. When you plan to do a movie, every scene
is set down. He knew how it would happen, I think. I tried to talk to him. It
didn't change a second. I am sure that if people had tried to get him [i.e., if
the men had not left the classroom], it might have been worse. Maybe he
would have shot everyone. Maybe he would have gone on shooting. It is
terrible now, but I am happy it wasn't worse. (Kastor B1)
Provost's first message attempted to alleviate guilt for possible complicity with Lepine
and for surviving. 15 It also created something to be grateful for--a bright side to the
tragedy: it is terrible now, but I am happy it wasn't worse. It cast the events of 6
December 1989 as something that she and others survived, rather than as an event that
simply killed her peers.
Provost's second message urged reporters to "use the power of information to explain to
men that women are equal to them. I am as much a human being as if I were a man; I
deserve as much respect, and I have the right to have my life the way I want it"
(Buchignani A1). Not willing to interrogate why men are privileged examples of human
beings, nor to consider the ways one's "right" to have one's life the way one wants is
always compromised, Provost demanded that the media stop their investigation and
direct their efforts "to explain to men that women are equal to them" (emphasis mine).
Her second message, then, directed at men in general, implies that she, like the
feminists, linked the massacre to broader societal attitudes.
Provost did offer a tentative narration and explanation of the event to the American
press. In an interview with Elizabeth Kastor of the Washington Post, she offered the
following account:
There were two crimes. The first one was something like a thief who comes 
into my house--the first crime was that. Everyone felt that. There's another 
crime, which was a guy attacking girls. I felt a bit like it was a rape. Maybe it's 
a strong word, but I feel a bit like that, and I have talked to friends who have 
had that experience and they felt as I do. (B1) 
Provost herself linked the Montreal Massacre with violence against women and identified
with rape victims. Moreover, she separated the experience of the Montreal massacre by
gender: all present felt the intrusion (burglary), but the women felt the violation (rape).
The massacre as analogous to rape also depends on/fosters community: Provost and her
friends talked to each other in order make sense of their experience. She does, however,
in this statement and in her message to the press distinguish herself and her own
experiences from others ("as if I were a man," "it felt a bit like rape"). She maintains her
individuality while still looking for similarities with others, for similarities with other
events that can help make sense of her own. However, the details of this interview were
not published in any English-language Canadian newspaper and later, Provost resisted
feminist interpretations of the event with: "this is our tragedy, our drama, we are the
victims, so will you please shut up with all your ideology?" (Provost as paraphrased by
Pelletier in Zerbisias A32). In light of her second message to the press and her interview
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with the Washington Post , it would seem that Provost was upset with the fact of the 
feminist testimony rather than its content: she was outraged that feminist testimony 
succeeded even though the "wrong person" performed the testimony. Her adamant 
claiming of this tragedy would seem a reaction against the loss of control over the event. 
By demanding silence, Provost was demanding that her views and experiences stand as 
the lone legitimate source of information or non-information.
Provost was not alone in this call for silence. In response to the public dialogue 
regarding the Montreal Massacre, the students at the Polytechnique became militantly 
apolitical. On the second anniversary of the massacre, the Polytechnique was the only 
major Canadian engineering school not to hold a commemorative service for the 
fourteen dead women. Defending the Polytechnique's silence, the Student Council 
president Serge Savard told the press that "we want a serene atmosphere where we can 
get on with life. . . . We're tired of the leering and the bad publicity" (Picard and York 
A1). On the first anniversary of the massacre, the school's director, André Bazergui, sent 
letters to several news outlets asking them to use restraint in their coverage: "Let's 
forget about this guy. This guy was completely crazy. By talking about him . . . you are 
just encouraging more crazy people to act like him" (Lalonde "Students' Silence" A5). 
This "you" is not only aimed at the media, who played an active role in the propagation 
and resolution of the massacre; it is also aimed at the feminists, who were perceived as 
needlessly propagating the massacre for their own purposes. Although Bazergui phrases 
his comment as a call for restraint for their own safety, he positions feminists as 
aggressors whose talk encourages  massacres.
Similarly, many students at the Polytechnique focused on the similarities between 
feminist arguments and Marc Lepine's. According to Bazergui, the students refused to 
rally publicly behind the feminist cause because they were uncomfortable using the 
"crazy logic" of Marc Lepine: "The girls and guys don't want to be separated like they 
were in the class by Lepine. They don't want to get into the crazy logic of Marc Lepine. 
They are saying, 'This happened to us as a community and we want to stick together'" 
(Lalonde "Students' Silence" A5). According to this view, the experience of the massacre, 
rather than creating a community based on "the fear with which every woman must live," 
created a community based on institutional proximity to the events of 6 December 
1989. Since the crime began with the students separating themselves into different 
corners of the room, any admission of gender difference became inseparable from this 
"complicitous" action. To the "guys and girls" still suffering from the results of gender 
separation and not completely placated by Provost's admonishment not to feel any guilt, 
admission of gender difference became inseparable from the fifteen deaths. The insanity 
of Lepine's logic, then, did not lie in his desire to kill feminists; the insanity of Lepine's 
logic lay in his forced separation of women and men.
Some students not only saw the feminists' and Lepine's logics as similar, they also 
sympathized with Lepine against the feminists by blaming the feminists, rather than 
him, for the murders. As Heidi Rathjen, a graduate of civil engineering, commented 
later:
Feminists got a really bad rap out of what happened at the Polytechnique. I
mean, people were telling them to shut up before they had even begun to say
anything. There was a mass denial of what had happened at the
Polytechnique, and part of that denial was to blame feminists for what had
happened.
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You have to understand, though, that immediately following the massacre, the 
entire Polytechnique was not thinking about male-female issues.
We were in intense mourning. These were our friends and classmates that had 
died and we just couldn't take on the social implications. It was impossible to 
see the big picture. Incomprehensible. (emphasis mine, "For Many Women, 
Mourning Is Not Enough"A1) 
Incapable of taking on the social implications of their tragedy, the students construed
Lepine and the fourteen dead women as casualties of feminism. The logic ran something
like this: if feminists had not talked of gender differences, none of this would have
happened--look, even now they can't even shut up, no wonder that Lepine was driven
crazy! Thus, if the feminists depended on the motives of Lepine to validate their
interpretation of the event and to combat his "crazy logic," the students, still in shock,
re-enacted his logic by blaming feminism for causing the massacre.
Provost's rejection of feminist testimony was conceivably a result of a double trauma.
Having once lost control of the situation to Lepine, Provost fought against losing control
of the script again. As the Washington Post article puts it:
That independence, that certainty, has shaped [Provost], she says. "I like to
make my own decisions," she says. "I like to rule my life." And so, when
Lepine walked into her classroom and began to make all the decisions and
rule everyone's life, it stung in a way Provost is still trying to explain. (B1)
For Provost, the feminist "usurpation" of the event could have re-enacted this loss of 
control, this rewriting of the script in which she, or her representative, was made to 
perform. Thus the hostility of Provost's response--"this is our tragedy, our drama, we 
are the victims, so will you please shut up with all your ideology"--could be due in part 
to a repetition of this loss of control: this time a loss of control over the media spectacle 
they had become and a loss of control over adjudicating which testimonies would be 
felicitous or infelicitous. Provost's angry insistence on her  decision could have been 
directed against either Lepine or the feminists: against either the man who created this 
event, or against the women who insisted on "never forgetting," who insisted on 
commemorating, publicizing, and propagating the event as a massacre , and who thus 
inadvertently elided the experiences of the other women present at the Polytechnique. 
However, after the feminist testimony had persuaded the general public to read the 
event as representative of violence against women, Provost and her peers reframed their 
objections in terms of a generational dispute. 
Cutting the Apron Strings
"Yes, yes, in theory, in my head, I am a feminist. But in my guts, basically, no.
I don't need--I won't say I don't need it because I did need it, and if I had
been born 50 years ago, I would have done the same as my mother. I just
don't feel it."
(Nathalie Provost qtd. in Lalonde "I Am Not" B1)
After the conflict over "true" victimhood, a generational conflict ensued over definitions
of feminism and agency. Opposing the older feminists' portrayal of universal female
victimhood, these younger women refused to accept the role of feminist
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heroines/victims. They fought against being represented by white ribbons worn on 6
December: they refused to be mourned over, and they refused to limit 6 December 1989
to the deaths of their peers. Taking up the rhetoric about their being "bright and shining
daughters," 16 they established themselves as the legitimate offspring of 60s radical
feminism who were "living the feminist principle"--and, as a natural evolution--
disposing of their "mothers'" adversarial methods (emphasis mine, Rathjen qtd. in "For
Many Women, Mourning is Not Enough" A1).
In the French-only film Au-delà du 6 décembre, Nathalie Provost and Catherine Fol
(another Polytechnique graduate) responded to the feminists by discrediting not the
validity but the relevance of their victimhood. According to Fol, the feminists are like
Moses, unable to cross over to the promised land because of their violent past:
The debate articulates itself differently now than it did 30 years ago. Because
we are different, a new generation. Feminists cleared the road for us and we
say thank you. But we are on that road right now. We grew up on it. We have a
different way of looking at it, a different way of working for feminism.
(Lalonde "I Am Not" B1)
Since "the debate articulates itself differently now," the older feminists are caught in a 
time warp, mistakenly applying old methods to a new situation they have "cleared the 
road" for but cannot understand. Provost and Fol insist that the Montreal Massacre was 
an accident on the new road of feminism and, as such, could not be rendered 
comprehensible as a normal occurrence. Thus, even surviving the massacre did not 
involve them in "women's struggles":
When feminists talk about women's struggles, I don't find myself in that. I
don't want women's struggles--not in my personal life, not in my
professional life, not with my boyfriend. Women's struggles have nothing to
do with me. . . . The massacre opened a lot of wounds for many women. We,
in our 20s, we don't have those wounds. (Fol qtd. in Zerbisias A1)
In Fol's world, desire and reality coincide: she finds what she wants. And, not only can
Fol choose not to involve herself in women's struggles, she emerge as a completely
unscathed "survivor" of the Montreal Massacre. From this position, Fol can allow that the
massacre may have been traumatic to others, but not to us, "in our 20s," because the
massacre merely reopened old wounds. 17 The "we, in our 20s" construction allows Fol
to conflate her own experiences with Provost's, though one could indeed argue that she
was unwounded, since she had graduated from the Polytechnique eighteen months prior
to the shootings. By concentrating on the "reopened wounds" of the older feminists, she
renders the pain these women feel as strangely incongruous with the actual event, and
turns a blind eye to the ways in which other bodies--including Provost's--were
wounded. Such a construction dismisses testimony by Sylvie Gagnon who was wounded
in the shooting. In the English film After the Montreal Massacre, Gagnon states that she
is "emotionally frozen . . . living in horror. I have lost the capacity to interpret what
happened. It was too huge, too unfair, too sick" (Quill F3). Such a construction of the
survivor as unwounded also denies the pain that other men and women associated with
the Polytechnique claim "will always be there" ("Pain of Lepine's 14 Killings Lives On"
A2). Lastly, such a construction unfairly blames the victim. As Fol so succinctly puts it:
"In my life, I don't have these problems because of my comportment, as an individual.
Men who are sexist are not sexist with me" (Conlogue, "Different Views" C2). Fol, then,
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can choose not to be involved in women's struggles because men heed her .
Through this gesture to disidentify as victims of the shootings, Fol and Provost now 
become outsiders to the Montreal Massacre. They become spectators to an unusual 
traumatic event and reassure themselves that this wounding, which actually happened to 
at least one of them, could not happen to them. This is a rather bizarre reversal of the 
"safety" that "unusual" traumatic events provoke: 
When trauma is unusual, we can pretend safety, engage in the daily self-
deceptions that allow us to believe ourselves beyond the reach of the unusual.
We can be spectators, titillated by the thrill of risk, safe behind our imaginary
psychic barriers; or we can watch in horror as trauma happens to others but
reassure ourselves that we are not next because we are safe so long as we do
not protest, do not stick out our necks and "make" ourselves into the target.
We can ignore the institutions of the society that appear to privilege us as
long as we pretend that we will not be next. (Suzanne Pharr qtd. in Laura S.
Brown 100-12)
Pharr and Brown, challenging the psychiatric definition of trauma as "outside the range" 
of normal human experience, controversially argue that traumatic stressors are found in 
everyday life, that trauma can work like repetitive stress syndrome. They argue that the 
classification of trauma as unusual not only denies the experiences of women who suffer 
from daily traumatic stressors, it also gives other women a sense of false safety. 
Provost's, like Fol's, reactions complicate Brown's and Pharr's analysis since it is the 
victim, rather than the outside witnesses or passersby, who insists on the unusualness 
of the event, on the event's inability to touch her. Thus, the actual victim becomes the 
spectator of someone else's trauma, admitting finally that she does not own the event, 
but also denying that the event owns her .
In opposition to (and emerging from the loins of) the older, battle-scarred feminists, the 
new woman arises, whole and impenetrable. She is the victim who cannot be victimized, 
the woman who cannot be wounded. To Fol, Provost exemplifies this new (non)victim: 
"Of course, Nathalie Provost is a victim of violence. What people didn't seem to like 
about her was that her reaction to it was one of strength. She would not play a role of 
weakness. She would not define her life in terms of what this madman had done"
(Conlogue C2). Arguably, Provost's response was one of strength. 18 She refused to go 
along with the script; she argued the terms; she refused to be Marc Lepine's feminist; 
and later, she refused to be the innocent victim whom others could commemorate with a 
white ribbon. Despite this, she did not resist his categorizations. Although she called his 
logic crazy, she did not question his formula that "feminists equal women who hate 
men." She preserved Lepine in his self-appointed role of judge/vigilante and accepted 
her role as the woman on trial, trying to explain away the presence of women in the
classroom to a man with the adjudicative power of a gun. 19 Before the barrel of the 
semiautomatic, she tried to explain to Marc Lepine that it was a case of mistaken 
identity. And she would do it again:
If Marc Lepine were in front of me tomorrow morning I would say the same
damn thing. It's true that I don't feel like a feminist. I feel like any guy does in
his life. I feel that way, period, with all the doors open in front of me. And if
someone who is sick tries to close it, well I'll open it, damn it. (emphasis
mine, "I Am Not a Feminist" B1)
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Here is the key to the (non)victim: feeling  like a guy, with the complete confidence of 
having assumed the male subject position. Tellingly, there are only two positions in this 
world: feeling like a guy or feeling like a feminist. Feeling like a woman is not even an 
option or possibility, or, to put it differently, being a woman is limited to either feeling 
like a guy or a feminist. Moreover, for Provost, Marc Lepine is someone sick who tries  to 
close doors (by killing women) and she opens  doors (by surviving). In this "just like a 
guy" world, agency and control are highlighted to such a degree that vulnerability
cannot even be narrated; thus, survival is narrated as winning, and winning is crucial. 20
Provost's willingness to repeat the event may be linked to her desire to relive her 
survival, but, by desiring to repeat the event as it happened, Provost must continue to 
explain that she is no different from a man, that she is no feminist and that Lepine 
should not shoot her. This repetition and escape of the event is evident in the very name 
of the film Au-delà du six décembre . It is "beyond" the sixth of December, and thus the 
leaving and surviving of the event, but it is also beyond every  sixth of December, rather 
than 6 December 1989. It is a beyond that repeats itself every year. As an annual event, 
this film resonates with feminist attempts to commemorate 6 December, but re-
inscribes December 6 as a day of surviving, rather than mourning. As Cathy Caruth 
argues, "repetition . . . is not simply the attempt to grasp that one has almost died but, 
more fundamentally and enigmatically, the very attempt to claim one's own survival . If 
history is to be understood as the history of trauma, it is a history that is experienced as 
the endless attempt to assume one's survival as one's own" (Caruth Unclaimed  64). 
Given the emphasis that Provost puts on surviving, on agency and on feeling, it should 
be no surprise that Provost repeatedly insists that her survival is her way of "winning" 
over Lepine. Upon receiving an award for female engineering students (set up by the 
funeral home that handled the funerals of Lepine's victims) Provost repeats, "for me, 
it [the award] is a way of saying to Marc Lépine that women will continue to be 
present and active in the fields of science and engineering . . . because I lived through 
the shooting, it is important to me that he doesn't win" (Moore A1).
Repeating the events of 6 December 1989, however, is not the most efficacious way to 
fight violence. Telling Lepine that they were "just women in engineering," "just students 
intent on leading a normal life," did not stop him from pulling the trigger, nor did it
stop pro-Lepine graffiti in other engineering schools. 21 Refusing to be hailed as a 
feminist did not stop the hail of the bullets. As Provost herself remarked after the 
massacre, her challenge "didn't change a second." Unfortunately, deciding that one is 
not going to be a victim does not prevent violence. Even women who believe fully in 
male-defined "merit" and who add their voices to the lobby against affirmative action 
and special scholarships for women are still threatening to some, are still, according to 
those who sympathized with Lepine, "instigating" violence. Lepine felt threatened by 
their very "I feel just like a guy" position. He wrote down the names of famous, vocal 
feminists to whom he had no access, but he hunted down the women who were 
personally threatening to him--women who were succeeding in a profession at which he 
had failed to even enter. Lepine saw them as subjects, hailed them as feminists, in order 
to blame them as the "cause" of his misery. Lepine did not see these women as victims, 
nor as battle-scarred. He agreed with their view that they have agency and that they 
hold responsibility for their own actions: Lepine claimed to be appointed by the Grim 
Reaper to punish these women and to make them take responsibility for their disruptive 
activity. Nathalie Provost's position does not oppose Marc Lepine's. It in fact eerily
repeats his view. 22
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Thus, feminism can produce a postfeminism virtually indistinguishable from 
antifeminism if it ends at claiming the rights of man, whatever those rights may be. 
Postfeminism's denial of systemic violence and the female body as always at risk is not 
simply a repudiation of ideology and sentimentality, but also a survival strategy: a 
survival strategy that conflates "feeling empowered" and "being empowered." By claiming 
to be equal at all costs, these women attempt to level the playing field, or, at the very 
least, synchronize themselves with the emphasis on "meritocracy" within these male-
dominated fields. What was devastating about the massacre, then, was that the 
postfeminism failed. Lepine should have put down his gun after Provost denied being a 
feminist, denied being different from a male engineer. And so, in response to this 
contradiction between "feeling like a guy" and being a woman, these women insist on a 
fantasy body--the victim that cannot be victimized. And this body continues to be 
beaten over and over again, as it covers over its wounds unable to heal.
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The impossibility of control that trauma exemplifies is traumatic to postfeminists. 
According to Caruth, traumatic experience cannot be treated as one's possession since it 
tends to possess the one who has survived it (Trauma  4-5). Because of this, trauma 
moves the subject position from that of screenwriter to that of a screen. Postfeminism 
as an ideology, however, makes seeing oneself as screen inadmissible and impossible. It 
renders "out of control" events beyond the experienceable. Provost and other immediate 
survivors of the massacre seemed caught in a trap, unable to acknowledge their wounds 
not only because of the belatedness of traumatic experience, but also because of their 
hypostatization of choice. Because the crime of Lepine was interpreted as the denial of 
their right to have their life the way they want it, the only way to fight back was by 
reclaiming this right while at the same time conceding the larger argument. Because of 
the need to construct an autonomous ever-present subject, postfeminists construed 
feminists as the cause of their distress, just as Lepine constructed feminists as the cause 
of his life's sufferings. In this world of freely acting subjects, responsibility had to be 
attributed to someone for the postfeminists' media (mis)representation, for the 
untethering of event and context. The question we must ask is: how has this been 
construed by young women such as Heidi Rathjen as "living the feminist principle," and 
by older feminists such as Stevie Cameron as fulfilling their mothers' dreams?
Judith Butler's warning to those who desire the wholeness of old-guard feminism gains 
new power when seen through the lens of the Montreal massacre:
If there is a fear that, by no longer being able to take for granted the subject,
its gender, its sex, or its materiality, feminism will founder, it might be wise
to consider the political consequences of keeping in their place the very
premises that have tried to secure our subordination from the start.
("Contingent Foundations" 19)
By taking for granted the sex, materiality, and gender of "women," by taking for granted 
the impact of violence on all women and "women's experience," feminism stumbled in 
the aftermath of the Montreal Massacre. This is not to say that feminism sunk 
irretrievably, for many women in engineering devastated by the failure of the 
postfeminist defense, such as myself, turned to feminism--especially to strands of 
feminism that called into question the freely choosing subject--for strategies to 
cope with and analyze our precarious position. This is to say that if feminism 
sentimentalizes victims while at the same time reifying the putative normal
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male subject, it risks producing a postfeminism that is almost indistinguishable from
antifeminism. It has, and will, produce a situation where women who have "made it"
must deny the discrimination they see in order to keep their precarious hold on the male
subject position. It has, and will, lead to "an incite to ressentiment" in which "failure
[turns] to recrimination by the subordinated, and guilt [turns] to resentment by the
'successful'" (Brown 67). This ressentiment threatens to sink feminism.
As Butler and others argue, the subject must instead be opened up, or deconstructed:
To take the construction of the subject as a political problematic is not the
same as doing away with the subject; to deconstruct the subject is not to
negate or throw away the concept; on the contrary, deconstruction implies
only that we suspend all commitments to that to which the term, "the
subject," refers, and that we consider the linguistic functions it serves in the
consolidation and concealment of authority. To deconstruct is not to negate
or to dismiss, but to call into question and, perhaps most importantly, to open
up a term, like the subject, to a reusage or redeployment that previously has
not been authorized. ("Contingent Foundations" 15)
This deconstruction of the subject position is imperative if women in male-dominated 
fields are to begin to experience and react against--rather than simply deny--
discrimination. This deconstruction of the subject offers a way to engage the problem of 
violence and violability that does not reduce to "victim" versus "nonvictim," "wounded" 
versus "unwoundable." In other words, in order to move "living the feminist principle" 
away from postfeminism, we must keep insisting that subjectivity is always 
compromised, that a fantasmatic identification with a wholly impenetrable and fully "in 
control" subject is not possible. This means that feminism--that we--must produce 
strategies for dealing with violence that do not allow for blindness or appropriation, for 
supermen or infants, so that we may deal with experiences outside our control rather 
than simply re-narrating them in the first person over and over again. 
Toward a Politics of Listening
Now, ten years after the massacre, the question I am still asking is: how could a difficult 
yet nonhostile encounter between feminists and postfeminist survivors have taken 
place? How will such an engagement take place? I do believe that such an encounter is 
still necessary, especially since the impact of the murders has not yet been dispelled; 
the murders return every year. Indeed, Provost's accusations against feminists can be 
understood as a cry for an such an ethical engagement. Her words resonate with 
Clorinda's cry--"why have you wounded me once more?"--in Tasso's story of Tancred's 
twice killing his beloved Clorinda (Caruth Unclaimed  2). As Caruth notes, we can read 
"the address of the voice here . . . as the story of the way in which one's own trauma is 
tied up with the trauma of another, the way in which trauma may lead, therefore, to the 
encounter with another, through the very possibility and surprise of listening to 
another's wound" (Unclaimed  8). Provost's complaint--that she has been once more 
wounded--and the fact that the person who inadvertently wounded her is herself 
traumatized by the wounding points to the intimate knot of traumatic experiences.
But before such an encounter can take place, we need to ask: how is an ethical 
engagement in the context of a traumatic event possible, given that so many women 
identified as  victims of Lepine? How can an ethical encounter take place given that the
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events in Montreal became construed as a 'national trauma'? The murders in Montreal 
defied comprehension and shocked a substantial percentage of the Canadian 
population. One year after the murders, headlines proclaimed: "Canadians haunted by 
Montreal's Ghosts," "A Year After the Trauma, the Answers and Insights Still Go 
Begging," "Scars, Fear, the Legacy of Montreal Massacre." Commentators such as Judy 
Rebrick, president of the nac, proclaimed that "in some way, all of us have been touched 
by it [the Montreal Massacre]" (Rebrick qtd. in Peritz A16). Although these statements 
are both extreme and banal, the murders did affect far more people than those present 
at the Polytechnique on 6 December 1989. To call it a national trauma, however, erases 
the differences between the woman in the classroom and the man watching the events 
unfold on the television.
Many women who were not present at the Polytechnique identified themselves as victims 
("each woman cried over having been symbolically put to death"). Moreover, in their 
mourning, many conflated the identities of Lepine's victims with other women. As Paula 
Sypnowich put it:
I do not wish to understate the tragedy of the deaths of those fourteen
women. But I mourn their deaths as I do the deaths of relatively anonymous
women who are raped and murdered, or as I would if Lépine had gunned
down fourteen strippers, bag ladies, or secretaries instead of fourteen
aspiring engineers. And I'll end up heartsick again when misogyny is no
longer 'topical,' and the media once again address women's issues only
through articles on daycare subsidies and debate over who does the dishes.
(130)
This move to mourn the murders in Montreal in the context of other violent acts, this
move to make the act of mourning the link between disparate violent events, enabled
many women to respond to the Montreal massacre. However, such a linkage can also
deny the singularity of the event. According to Dori Laub, "trauma is . . . an event that
has no beginning, no ending, no before, no during and no after. This absence of
categories that define it lends it a quality of "otherness," a salience, a timelessness and a
ubiquity that puts it outside the range of associatively linked experiences, outside the
range of comprehension, of recounting and of mastery" (Felman and Laub 69). To those,
such as Provost, who saw the event unfold and yet could still not view it as "other," this
mourning did violence to the event and to themselves. How then can we negotiate
multiple and possibly conflicting testimonies between witnesses, with the ever-present
possibility that the witness who propagates the accident can inadvertently re-traumatize
the eyewitness? How, then, can we listen and respond to testimony so that one
testimony does not substitute for another, but rather resonates with it?
We first need to acknowledge the limitations of agency and the involuntary nature of
identification, without allowing the involuntary to stand as an excuse or justification for
substituting one testimony for another. 24 In the aftermath of the Montreal Massacre,
the line between identifying with and identifying as was breached, partly due to the
belatedness of traumatic experience, partly due to Lepine's separation between intended
and actual victims, partly due to the fact that one does not need to be present in order
to feel threatened by an event. Women who mourned for themselves as they mourned
these murders, who testified to these murders as representative of their own
experiences, may have been belatedly testifying to and experiencing an earlier traumatic 
event. Women, such as Francine Pelletier who were Lepine's intended
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victims--if we take Lepine's words at face value--inadvertently made peace impossible 
for other victims who were actually in the line of fire. Women who spoke about the 
massacre as reawakening their sense of vulnerability, who identified as potential  victims, 
denied the difference between feeling threatened and being threatened. Even if one is 
working through another event, identifying as the victim rather than with her poses the 
possibility of violating the eyewitness. "Outsider" testimony can easily substitute for 
eyewitness testimony.
The conflict between responding to and identifying with eyewitness experiences is one 
of the most important challenges to theories of trauma. Since traumatic events are 
experienced only in conjunction with another event, traumatic events will necessarily 
produce conflicting testimonies. Testimony is both an enabling and disabling violence. 
The intertwining of experience that trauma demands means that testifying is not 
enough: we must also respond and listen to others' testimony so that the self does not 
take the place of the other. The need to maintain the separation between events, while 
at the same time respecting the need to testify, is key to any engagement among 
witnesses. Even if, as Laura Brown controversially argues, trauma is not unusual and we 
need to include "as traumatic stressors all of those everyday, repetitive, interpersonal 
events that are so often the sources of psychic pain for women" (108), there are still 
unusual traumatic events such as the Montreal Massacre. Although I agree with Brown 
that admitting the immanence of trauma will help dispel the illusion that we are 
invulnerable, I question the assumption that "acknowledging we might be next" is the
best way to link together gender-based trauma. 25 For, by acknowledging we might be 
next, we not only identify with the victims, we risk identifying as them. If we 
"acknowledge we might be next," we are forced to assume that our experiences can or 
will be the same. We avoid confronting experiences and selves as other and risk looking 
only at ourselves and our own possibilities. As the aftermath of the Montreal Massacre 
makes clear, arguing via experiential analogy--making certain experiences 
representative of others--can and will lead to conflict.
A better way to relate traumatic events is via citation, by arguing that the force of the 
traumatic event comes partly from its citation of other such events. By doing so, we can 
link events together, yet insist on the singularity of each one. Iteration alters, yet a 
citation gains force only because it "repeats" or refers to other events. If we view such 
events as citations, we can discuss larger social implications in ways that shift the focus 
away from the perpetrator's inner psychology or intentions. Rather, we can discuss 
the community that the perpetrator joins with his/her actions. Butler, commenting 
on the force of the racial slur argues:
The racial slur is always cited from elsewhere, and in the speaking of it, one
chimes in with a chorus of racists, producing at that moment the linguistic
occasion for an imagined relation to an historically transmitted community of
racists. In this sense, racist speech does not originate with the subject, even if
it requires the subject for its efficacy, as it surely does. Indeed, racist speech
could not act as racist speech if it were not a citation of itself; only because
we already know its force from prior instances do we know it to be so
offensive now, and we brace ourselves against its future invocations. The
iterability of hate speech is effectively dissimulated by the "subject" who
speaks the speech of hate. (Excitable 80)
In terms of the Montreal Massacre, Lepine's actions reached beyond his immediate
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victims because, in his address and actions, he cited other events and called others to 
respond to them as such. Lepine's actions also linked him with an historically 
transmitted community of misogynists and this link to a larger community made his 
actions to some degree comprehensible. Again, this link does not make his actions 
completely understandable. It does, however, offer us a larger political goal: to destroy 
the community made possible by such citations (in terms of Butler's example "an 
historically transmitted community of racists"). Citation also offers us a way to think 
about the community established by the act of testifying. Through this speech act, one 
links oneself with others who have also testified and thus testimony cannot be 
construed as an individual act that does not involve others. Lastly, since every citation is 
also an appropriation, it foregrounds the possible violence of citation.
Sylvie Gagnon's moving testimony in After the Montreal Massacre  attests to the 
traumatic experience as citation. Filmed one year after the massacre, Gagnon speaks of 
her experiences in the cafeteria of the Polytechnique on 6 December 1989--the day she 
completed all the requirements for her engineering degree. Lepine entered the cafeteria 
and began shooting the women. After a bullet grazed her head, she lay on the floor 
playing dead, but refused to faint in order to see what was happening. As Lepine walked 
between herself and another woman who lay beside her, he shot the other woman 
point blank. After he passed by, she ran from the Polytechnique to a friend's home 
in order to transmit her story. To help both herself and her friend believe that the 
events she "witnessed" were real, they watched the news coverage on television.
Like Provost, Gagnon was soon angry at the interpretations propagated through the 
media. However, rather than railing against feminists for having usurped her tragedy, 
she argued that media analysts had tried to turned her tragedy into an "isolated event," 
and had sought to explain her tragedy in the terms of Lepine's life-story. For her, this 
event was linked to "all the little sadnesses" and abuse that she, and other women, had 
suffered through their entire lives, to all those daily episodes "too small" to be 
registered. According to Gagnon, women's testimonies exploded after the Montreal 
massacre because the murders "recalled" all these other little sadnesses. Importantly, 
Gagnon did not seek to understand Lepine in any way. Gagnon states that she does not 
know Lepine and she does not want to know Lepine--to her Lepine is death. She did not 
view his suicide letter or his intentions as necessary to understanding the massacre, but 
rather as a way to avoid  doing so. Unlike other feminists, she refused to link her 
interpretation to his intentions. Rather, the event's significance stemmed from its ability 
to re-call  other women's sadnesses. Gagnon was also able to testify because she was 
not a postfeminist. As she put it, the murders did not teach her anything, but rather 
made her feel with her nerves and her body what she had always known in her head. For 
this reason, she was able to "already know its force from prior instances." Arguably, she 
was able to speak because of her "other" little sadnesses, and her "other" little 
sadnesses opened her to the pain of other women.
If Gagnon's feminism and history prepared her for the murders, the feminists' emphasis 
on fact-finding and on disseminating their testimony foreclosed the possibility of 
listening to the survivors' testimonies. It reduced the massacre to a question of 
knowledge about Lepine. As Laub argues, refusing to listen can take place through "a 
foreclosure through facts . . . an obsession with fact-finding; an absorbing interest in 
the factual details of the account which serve to circumvent the human experience. 
Another version of this foreclosure, of this obsession with fact-finding is a listener who 
already 'knows it all,' ahead of time, leaving little space for the survivor's story" (Felman
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and Laub 73). Those who pinned their interpretations of the Montreal Massacre on 
knowledge of Lepine left little space for survivors' stories as anything other than 
corroborating testimony. Because of this, there was little opportunity for witnesses 
to testify together  to a truth inaccessible to anyone alone. By this, I do
not mean to imply that simple cooperation between witnesses is sufficient, nor that 
consensus should be the goal, nor that we must simply respect the survivor's desire for 
silence and stop testifying. Instead, I am suggesting a politics and practice of listening 
as a necessary complement to a politics of testifying. I am suggesting a politics that 
does not valorize the act of speaking in and of itself: a politics that listens to a person's 
speech or silence and then grapples with the question of how to respond to it. In other 
words, I am suggesting a politics that begins, rather than ends with, the speaking 
subject, that begins with the other who addresses us with her speech or silence.
Gagnon was able to testify because she externalized the event through a sympathetic 
interview with Gerry Rogers, a former nun and advocate against violence. Through this 
interview, Gagnon turns to television--the same medium that initially corroborated her 
testimony--to externalize and validate it. According to Laub, "re-externalization of the 
event can occur and take effect only when one can articulate and transmit  the story, 
literally transfer it to another outside oneself and then take it back again, inside. Telling 
thus entails a reassertion of the hegemony of reality and a re-externalization of the evil 
that affected and contaminated the trauma victim" (Felman and Laub 69). Through this 
interview, Gagnon speaks, validates, and transmits the story, from a position of enabling 
vulnerability. She presents a narrative that refuses the position of either superman or 
child. Although she talks about her childhood dreams and her belief, prior to Lepine's 
actions, that the world was hers, she does not insist on returning to these dreams and 
beliefs. Rather, she says that she is a different person now, that such an event changes a 
person, and that slowly she is dealing with the pain and the trauma, that it gets better 
every day.
Through a politics of listening, both testimony and an historical understanding of 6 
December 1989 emerges. A politics of listening, as Laub describes it, is a contract that 
emphasizes recognizing and meeting "'the gaping, vertiginous black hole' of the 
experience of the trauma" (64). Such a contract acknowledges that, by listening, we 
become implicated in the traumatic event, but that we are still separate human beings:
the listener to trauma comes to be a participant and co-owner of the
traumatic event: through his very listening, he comes to partially experience
trauma in himself. The relation of the victim to the event of the trauma, 
therefore, impacts on the relation of the listener to it, and the latter comes to 
feel the bewilderment, injury, confusion, dread and conflicts that the trauma 
victim feels. He has to address all these, if he is to carry out his function as a 
listener, and if trauma is to emerge, so that its henceforth impossible 
witnessing can indeed take place. . . . The listener has to feel the victim's 
victories, defeats and silences, know them from within, so that they can 
assume the form of testimony.
The listener, however, is also a separate human being and will experience
hazards and struggles of his own, while carrying out his function of a witness
to the trauma witness. While overlapping, to a degree, with the experience of
the victim, he nonetheless does not become the victim--he preserves his own
separate place, position and perspective; a battleground for forces raging in
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himself, to which he has to pay attention and respect if he is to properly carry
out his task. (Felman and Laub 58)
The important task in listening, then, is to feel the victim's victories, defeats and
silences, know them from within, while at the same time acknowledging that one is not
the victim, so that the victim can testify, so that the truth can be reached together. In
this model, distance must be maintained between listener and speaker. The listener
must remember that as s/he feels the victim's victories, defeats, and silences, s/he is
also re-experiencing her own and involuntarily relating them to her own life. She must
constantly ask, "what is being elided in my identifications with the speaker?" As well, the
goal is not to cure either the listener or the speaker, but rather to respond and listen so
that survival is possible. 44
Such a contract is based on lack  of comprehension. As Caruth, in her reading of the
dialogue between the French women and Japanese man in Hiroshima mon amour ,
argues, "[t]heir ability to speak and to listen in their passionate encounter does not rely .
. . on what they simply know of one another, but on what they do not fully know in their
traumatic pasts." That is, "[w]hat we see and hear, in Hiroshima mon amour , resonates
beyond what we can know and understand; but it is in the event of this
incomprehension and in our departure from sense and understanding that our own
witnessing may indeed begin to take place" (56). By emphasizing gaps in understanding,
in refusing interpretations that reduce traumatic events to factors we can know, we 
may begin the encounter that may help us finally to say together, au-delà du six 
décembre dix-neuf quatre-vingt neuf . This contract of listening must be
accompanied by a relentless critique of the ways in which the belief in and desire for a
sovereign subject undermines systemic changes to society and undermines feminism.
This contract of listening must be accompanied by a politics that understands acts of
violence not as "representative of" or "substitutable for" each other, but by a politics that
sees these acts as forceful because they recall other events, because they open the self
to others. Such a contract of listening would allow for history. Perhaps with these
strategies in hand we may finally encounter each other without recriminations and
hostility, but also without sentimentality and identity as appropriation of the same.
Wendy Hui Kyong Chun  is an assistant professor of Modern Culture and Media at Brown
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Notes
1. See Ginette Bastien's and Renée Ouiment's "A little story of censorship" and Mary
Lamey's "Lepine rampage was a 'cold, rational act,' Pelletier says."
2. Sylvie Gagnon, a survivor of the massacre, describes other women's reactions to the
massacre as "an explosion" in After the Montreal Massacre. In this documentary, various
women discuss the impact of violence on their daily existence and the impact of the
Montreal Massacre on their lives. For more on the flood of testimony by women who
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identified with or as victims of Lepine, or who sought to make connections between
Lepine's victims and the "ordinary" victims of male violence, see The Montreal Massacre;
see also Sue Montgomery's "Slayings, Attacks on Women Continue as Nation Remembers
14 Dead Students." For more on the impact of the Montreal Massacre on the feminist
movement, and the importance of commemorating, contextualizing and responding to
this event, see Lynda Hurst's "Legacy of the Montreal Massacre"; Jim Coyle's "Women
Appeal for the End of Violence"; Ingrid Peritz's "Scars, Fear, the Legacy of the Montreal
Massacre"; André Picard's and Geoffrey York's "Women Vow 'Never Again'"; Jason
Robert's "A Personal Response to the Lepine Massacre"; Patrick Quinn's "Society Slowly
Learning it Need Not Accept Violence"; Lindsay Kines's "Soaring Violence Figures Have
Groups Calling for Grassroots Action"; Alanna Mitchell's "Montreal Massacre a Catalyst
for Action"; and Michael Kaufman's "A Letter to Marc Lepine." Now, ten years after the
murders, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation is planning a two-hour documentary
on it.
3. To be clear, I am not arguing that feminism has never taken on the issue of silence or
listening. Listening to Silences (Hedges and Fishkin) is one example of this engagement.
However, feminists usually listen to silence in order to break it, or attribute silence to
institutional, economic or cultural hardships or differences. Rarely has the question of
how to listen, or listening as a political act, been addressed.
4. Shoshana Felman, in Testimony, argues:
What testimony does not offer is, however, a completed statement, a
totalizable account of those events. In the testimony, language is in process
and in trial, it does not possess itself as a conclusion, as the constation of a
verdict or the self-transparency of knowledge. Testimony is, in other words, a
discursive practice, as opposed to a pure theory. To testify--to vow to tell, to
promise and produce one's own speech as material evidence for truth--is to
accomplish a speech act, rather than to simply formulate a statement. As a
performative speech act, testimony in effect addresses what in history is
action that exceeds any substantialized significance, and what in happenings
is impact that dynamically explodes any conceptual reifications and any
constative delimitations. (5)
5. As I argue later in this paper, this constant publicity forced eyewitnesses to
constantly relive the episode. This is not to say that a juridical inquiry guarantees
protection from publicity. It is to say that without a juridical inquiry, the witnesses have
no control over the interpretation and propagation of the event. Without someone
sanctioning and privileging their testimony, they seemed condemned forever to read
about themselves with no other outlet for their own stories than the media itself.
6. For instance, Armande Saint-John argues, "All evidence shows that this man
committed an insane act. But he did it in a lucid, conscious manner. He suffered a sort
of madness, certainly, but not the kind of insanity that severs all contact with reality and
plunges one's conscious mind into total unconsciousness. His gesture was completely
thought out, consciously chosen, premeditated: he even took the trouble to explain it in
a letter he wrote. The murderer himself furnished all the evidence necessary to
understand what he'd done" (62).
7. The slippage between Lepine's suicide and murderous actions is odd. According to
his letter, his suicide, rather than these murders, is political. Interestingly, as Lepine
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condemns these women for taking responsibility for their actions, he himself denies his
agency. He is "forced" by the Grim Reaper to take extreme action.
8. One strain of feminist thought seemed completely to ignore Lepine's insanity. For
instance, Erin Graham, a counsellor at Vancouver Rape Relief argued that Lepine's
actions were "not an individual act. It is not just one man hating women. It is the social
and political reality we live in" (Graham qtd. in Bergman, et al. 18). Diana Bronson
writes:
It does not matter that the man who decided to kill 14 women--and he clearly
did decide to do that--killed himself afterward; it is not of him I am afraid. I
am afraid of what he represents, of all the unspoken hatred, the pent-up
anger that he expressed. Hatred and anger that is shared by every husband
who beats his wife, every man who abuses his child, and by many more who
would not dare. It happened at the École Polytechnique in Montreal but it
could have been anywhere. (A7)
Nicole Brossard argues that "the events at the polytechnique are there to remind us that
from male politics (misogyny, phallocentrism and ordinary sexism) to men's political
response (antifeminism), what is obvious is self-evident; men are just as hostile to
women when they make no demands (women) as when they claim their rights
(feminists), whether women pay attention to them (heterosexuals), or ignore them
(lesbians)" ("One Year After" 18). Suzanne Sprott argues, "This was not an isolated case
of anger. Lepine's act epitomized the anger that is directed to women on a daily basis.
The anger Lepine manifested in the shootings is anger that resides in many men. We as
a society excuse that behavior and perpetrate it in the media, advertising, and the
socialization of our little girls and little boys. The oppression he speaks about in his
suicide letter is an oppression that most women carry and live with every day of their
lives. Until every person takes responsibility in the Montreal Massacre, violence toward
women, and people in general, will continue to exist" (A20). In his letter to Marc Lepine,
Michael Kaufman writes, "I agreed with you when you said you were rational. In a world
where women, since the story of Eve, have been blamed for the ills of humankind, there
was something rational about your response" (A23). Another strain noted his insanity,
but argued his insanity did not belie his act as a premeditated political attack. In
addition to Armande Saint-John's and Francine Pelletier's arguments, Patrick Quinn
argued that "These murders will perhaps be accepted as random and irrational, but they
will also be seen as an act against all women, the ultimate in sexist violence . . . all
women felt fear" (B3). MP Barbara Green called Lepine's act the "manic edge of hatred by
men against women" (Green qtd. in Peter O'Neill A15).
9. For instance, Lynda Hurst, in "Legacy of the Montreal Massacre," begins her account
with Lepine's suicide note, rather than the shootings (A1). Hurst writes, "in the
immediate aftermath of the tragedy, feminists clung to each other at vigils and rallies,
physically aching with grief, anger and a reawakened awareness of their own
vulnerability." (A1). Catherine Ford argued that "every woman can feel the hatred" ("Every
Woman A4).
10. For more on the changes to, effects on, and recriminations against engineering, see
Michelle Lalonde's "Women's Enrolment up at site of Montreal Massacre"; Catherine
Dunphy's "École Polytechnique Slayings Spark Engineer's War on Sexism"; Alanna
Mitchell's "Sexism in Engineering Decried" and "Women Say Engineering Hostile Field";
Frances Bula's "UBC Adds Sexism Course for Engineering Students"; John Davidson's
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"Schools Tone Down Engineering Week"; Mary Lamey's "'Engineer as lout' a Canadian
Image"; George Oake's "Metro Engineer Urges Colleagues to Fight Against Sexism at
Alberta School"; Gord Cope's "Designing a New Image." Female enrollment in
engineering programs at the Polytechnique in September 1989 reached a new record: 25
percent of the first-year class were female. At the University of New Brunswick, female
enrollment increased to 18% from 11.9%. At Guelph, 38% of first-year students in
engineering were women. At Queen's University, more than 20% of the first-year class
were female, a jump of more than 5% from the previous year (Statistics Taken from
Cornacchia's "The New Engineers"). For more on women in engineering in Canada, see
More Than Just Numbers: Report of the Canadian Committee on Women in Engineering.
11. Claude Lanzmann, in "The Obscenity of Understanding," argues that attempts to
answer the question, "Why were Jews killed in the holocaust?" are obscene. By this, he
means that there is an abyss between various psychological and economic reasons
behind the Holocaust and these actual deaths:
All these fields of explanation (referring to unemployment in Germany, and so
on) are all true and all false. They're all true together and all false in the same
way. And it is a very flat truth, because you cannot proceed in that way--you
cannot precisely engender the Holocaust. It is impossible. Between all these
conditions--which were necessary conditions maybe, but they were not
sufficient--between all these conditions and the gassing of three thousand
persons, men, women, children, in a gas chamber, all together, there is an
unbreachable discrepancy. It is simply not possible to engender one out of the
other. There is no solution of continuity between the two; there is rather a
gap, an abyss, and this abyss will never be bridged. (206)
Although the Montreal Massacre and the Holocaust are not analogous, they both point
to a gap in understanding. Although I do not believe that understanding the massacre as
the result of misogyny is obscene, I do not believe that Lepine's misogyny, or his living
in a patriarchal society, can adequately explain the deaths of these fourteen women.
12. For instance, Anthony Johnson, writing on the second anniversary of the murders,
reports both on a female engineering student who lost a friend in the massacre and will
thus attend memorial services, and on female engineering students who are too busy
preparing for their examinations to attend. He states that all the women he interviewed
"stressed they've been treated well in the male-dominated faculty." He also singles out
Betty Yee's opinions, without separating his words from hers: "The 20-year-old believes
that the murders were more an act of a sick lunatic than symbols of misogyny,
expressing some concern about the politicization of the tragedy by hard-core feminists.
If women's groups across Canada continue to use the event for 'men-bashing,' she
suggests, it might be better for all of us to let it fade into history" (C12). By
concentrating on female engineering students, Johnson also ignores complaints leveled
against the profession by female engineers (see Alanna Mitchell's "Sexism in Engineering
Decried").
13. Shoshana Felman, interpreting Barbara Johnson's question, writes:
If it is the accident that pursues the witness, it is the compulsive character of
the testimony which is brought into relief: the witness is "pursued," that is, at
once compelled and bound by what, in the unexpected impact of the accident,
is both incomprehensible and unforgettable. The accident does not let go: it is
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an accident from which the witness can no longer free himself.
But if, in a still less expected manner, it is the witness who pursues the
accident, it is perhaps because the witness, on the contrary, has understood
that from the accident a liberation can proceed and that the accidenting,
unexpectedly, is also in some ways a freeing. (Felman and Laub 23)
In terms of the aftermath of the Montreal Massacre, the feminists pursued the accident
so that "a freeing" could take place (i.e. the massacre could bring attention to and
legislation against violence against women). However, their freeing also augmented the
ways in which the accident was pursuing women such as Nathalie Provost. In reaction to
this pursuit, Provost would conflate feminist testimony with the actual event.
14. On the appointment to bear witness, Shoshana Felman writes:
Since testimony cannot be simply relayed, repeated or reported by another
without thereby losing its function as a testimony, the burden of the witness-
-in spite of his or her alignment with other witnesses--is a radically unique,
noninterchangeable and solitary burden. "No one bears witness for the
witness," writes the poet Paul Celan. To bear witness is to bear the solitude of
a responsibility, and to bear the responsibility, precisely, of that solitude.
And yet, the appointment to bear witness is, paradoxically enough, an
appointment to trangress the confines of that isolated stance, to speak for the
other and to others. (Felman and Laub 3)
15. Provost's message, however, is ambiguous. She states, "I am sure that if people had
tried to get him, it might have been worse," rather than "it would have been worse."
Thus, she is sure that there is a possibility that it could have been worse, which leaves
open the possibility that it could have been better as well.
16. One of the most cited and powerful articles is Stevie Cameron's "Our Daughters,
Ourselves." Radical feminists, such as Nicole Lacelle, construed these women as their
"daughters" whom they sought to mold as empowered offspring:
Why take it out on young women who would never have imagined there could
be negative implications to what they were doing? They innocently inherited
the career openings we feminists, fully aware of what we were doing, created
for women. Why take it out on them, on those "civilians," and not us militants?
Simply because they followed in our footsteps? They were so far behind that
they'd lost sight of us. For them, it was all very simple--they wanted to
become engineers, that's all. It was there for them, available, as long as they
came up with the academic and personal effort normally expected to
accomplish such a goal. For us it was different, we were on enemy territory,
shells exploding around us from all directions; it didn't take much to figure
out there was a war going on. These young women ended up standing in No
Man's Land; it was too easy to ignore that the peace treaty had never been
signed. (28).
17. Reaction to these arguments by the older feminists was understandably hostile. To
many older feminists, these younger women became lumped in with "the enemy." In
such articles as Catherine Ford's "Truths about Sexism Bear Repeating," older feminists
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lashed out at these young women: "I'm tired of yelling at men for their gender's
mistreatment of women. So I'll yell at young women instead. We have failed to teach you
history" (A4). Ford combats the younger women's notion that "we are living in an equal
and fair world" and takes on the duty of preventing the younger generation from
repeating the past by informing them that they haven't come a long way, baby. But the
article ends on a frustrated note. Emphasizing her sense of estrangement, Ford asks
"But are young women listening anymore?" (A4).
18. See Sharon Marcus, "Fighting Bodies, Fighting Words."
19. This resonates with the classic woman-on-trial image that Jennifer Wicke discusses
in "Postmodern Identities and the Politics of the (Legal) Subject."
20. As the Washington Post article argues:
[Provost] also wants to tell her fellow students not to be defeated. One friend,
she says, is "very shaken" by the attack, and Provost is worried that she may
abandon her plans to be an engineer. "I will speak to her because I want her
to continue. It's my feeling if some girls don't go through Polytechnique, don't
finish their course, we let the guy win. He will win." Her voice quivering, she
says, "We can't let that happen." (B1)
21. See Pauline Greenhill's "A Good Start." The repetition of Lepine's words in graffiti
would seem to confirm the authorities' fears that analyzing the massacre would produce
antifeminist sentiments. However, this violence was restrained to graffiti: there were no
copycat massacres.
22. According to Antonia Zerbisias, the massacre haunts Provost, not "because of the
way the light go[es] out in her friend's eyes as they died, a sight that makes her shudder
still. Nor because she survived and others didn't. Not even because she spent months
trying to walk again. No, it's the f-word that bothers her still. Feminism" (A1). If this
analysis is correct, Provost would seem to have identified with Lepine to the extent that
feminism is at the "heart" of her discomfort. It would seem that Provost has collapsed
Lepine's taking over her classroom and feminist's taking over her testimony.
23. This fantasy of the body as sublime object is itself testimony to the event of trauma.
For a rereading of Lacan's notion of the sublime object, see Slavoj Zizek, The Sublime
Object of Ideology (18, 71). For Zizek, the sublime object is related both to the symbolic
and to the real--and hence to trauma, since for Zizek any encounter with the real is
traumatic. Also, according to Felman, it is only by exploring one's injury that liberation
is possible:
To seek reality is both to set out to explore the injury inflicted by it--to turn
back on, and try to penetrate, the state of being stricken, wounded by reality .
. . --and to attempt, at the same time, to reemerge from the paralysis of this
state, to engage reality . . . as an advent, a movement, and as a vital critical
necessity of moving on. It is beyond the shock of being stricken, but
nonetheless within the wound and from within the woundedness that the
event, incomprehensible though it may be, becomes accessible. (Felman and
Laub 28)
On the desire to repeat the departure from the event of trauma, see Cathy Caruth's
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introduction to and first chapter in Unclaimed Experience.
24. For more on the involuntary nature of identification, on "the formative role [that the
unconscious plays] in the production of identifications" (9), see Diana Fuss's
Identification Papers.
25. Laura S. Brown argues:
But when we admit to the immanence of trauma in our lives, when we see it
as something more likely to happen than not, we lose our cloak of
invulnerability. A feminist analysis, illuminating the realities of women's lives,
turns a spotlight on the subtle manifestations of trauma, allows us to see the
hidden sharp edges and secret leghold traps, whose scars we have borne or
might find ourselves bearing. We are forced to acknowledge that we might be
next. We cannot disidentify with those who have already been the victims of a
traumatic stressor when we hold in consciousness our knowledge that only an
accident may have spared us thus far. (108)
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